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Real Property
by Linda S. Finley*
I. INTRODUCTION
The survey period, June 1, 2010 through May 31, 2011,' saw
continued dire economic times for Georgia and the entire United States,
which were marked with a record-breaking number of foreclosures.'
Georgia courts and the Georgia General Assembly began to pay attention
to the foreclosure process, the diminution of property values, and how
these issues affect Georgia families. Although the purpose of this
Article is not to specifically address these serious issues, judicial and
legislative trends indicate that these issues will be around for some time.

* Shareholder in the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz,
P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F.
George School of Law (J.D., 1981). Member, State and Federal Bars of Georgia and
Florida, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the United States
Supreme Court.
The Author wishes to give special thanks to Kitty S. Davis, who, year after year, has
graciously handled the administrative tasks in bringing this Article to print. Additional
thanks goes to Robert A. "Andy" Weathers, Esq. (Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law, J.D., 1966) whose constant guidance is reflected in the Article; and Carol
V. Clark, Esq. (University of Georgia, J.D., 1976) for her assistance, research, and analysis.
Particularly, the Author directs the reader to Carol V. Clark, 2011 Judicial Update, 2011
REAL PROPERTY LAW INSTITUTE MATERIALS (Institute of Continuing Legal Education in
Georgia 2010).
1. For analysis of Georgia real property during the prior survey period, see Linda S.
Finley, Real Property,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 62 MERCER L. REv. 283 (2010).
2.

John Prior, Foreclosuresin 2011 to Break Last Year's Record: RealtyTrac, HOUSING

11:01 PM), http://www.housingwire.com/2011/01/12/foreclosures-reachrecord-high-in-2010-realtytrac.
WIRE (Jan. 12,2011,

3.

See generally Understand Why Foreclosures Matter, FORECLOSURE-RESPONSE.ORG

(Aug. 4, 2011, 8:21 AM), http://www.foreclosure-response.org/policy guide/why-fore
closuresmatter.html?tierid=263.
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LEGISLATION

Even though legislation affecting real property was perhaps overshadowed by legislation regarding tax reform, 4 immigration, 5 and Sunday
alcohol sales,6 legislation regarding real property was, albeit more
quietly, enacted. House Bill 117' amended section 48-7-128 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A), adding language
requiring that a party identified as the seller on a settlement statement
be treated as the seller for all purposes of assessing withholding or other
tax.' The amendment further burdens the identified seller with
"executing and delivering to the buyer or transferee all forms or other
documents incident to determining the appropriate amount of tax to be
withheld or the appropriate amount exempt from withholding requirements."10
Apparently in response to the fear of "robo-signing,"11 the legislature
enacted Senate Bill 64.12 This bill, along with changing the fees and
penalties for reinstatement of defunct corporations," amended provisions relating to the execution of those instruments, defined in O.C.G.A.
§ 14-5-7," which convey interests in real property or release security
agreements." The amendment specifies when an executed document
lacking a corporate seal may be conclusive evidence that the person
signing the instrument is a proper signatory and that the signature is

4. Ga. H.R. Bill 388, Reg. Sess. (2011) (unenacted).
5. Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act, Ga. H.R. Bill 87, Reg. Sess., 2011
Ga. Laws 794 (to be codified in scattered sections of O.C.G.A. tits. 13, 16, 17, 35, 36, 42,
45, 50).
6. Ga. S. Bill 10, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 49 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 3-3-7 (Supp.
2011)).
7. Ga. H.R. Bill 117, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 674 (codified in scattered sections of
O.C.G.A. tits. 31 & 49).
8. O.C.G.A. § 48-7-128 (Supp. 2011).
9. O.C.G.A. § 48-7-128(b) (Supp. 2011).
10. O.C.G.A. § 48-7-128(b)(3).
11. Robo-signing is defined as when "lain employee of a mortgage servicing company
[] signs foreclosure documents without reviewing them. Rather than actually reviewing the
individual details of each case, robo-signers assume the paperwork to be correct and sign
it automatically" without personal knowledge. Robo-Signer, INVESTOPEDIA, www.investo
pedia.com/term/r/robo-signer.asp (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
12. Ga. S. Bill 64, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 430 (codified in scattered sections of
O.C.G.A. tit. 14).
13. Id. § 1.
14. O.C.G.A. § 14-5-7 (Supp. 2011).
15.

Id.
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genuine." Under the amendment, only the signature of the president,
vice president, secretary, or assistant secretary of the corporation will be
considered conclusive evidence." The signatures of any other officers
or individuals designated by corporate officers to execute such documents
are no longer conclusive evidence that such documents are properly
executed."
III. TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY
In Brock v. Yale Mortgage Corp.,i" the ex-husband (Brock) brought
an action against his ex-wife and Yale Mortgage to quiet title in the
residence that the Brocks once shared. The Brocks purchased the
residence in 1987 with funds from a mortgage loan, repayment of which
was secured by the residence. The couple held title to the property
jointly. Over the years, the Brocks' mortgage loan went into default
several times, but each time Mrs. Brock was either able to cure the
default or work out a payment plan. In January 2001, the loan went
into default again, and the bank threatened foreclosure. Mrs. Brock did
not inform Mr. Brock of the default but worked with a mortgage broker
to refinance the loan solely in her name. The mortgage broker informed
Mrs. Brock that Mr. Brock had to convey his interest in the residence to
her in order to complete the transaction, and Mrs. Brock obtained a
blank quitclaim deed from the closing attorney for her husband to sign.
At the closing, Yale Mortgage paid off the previous mortgage loan and
paid additional cash to Mrs. Brock, and she presented an executed,
unrecorded quitclaim deed featuring Mr. Brock's signature, which was
later recorded. Yale Mortgage recorded a security deed evidencing the
loan against the property. In 2004, Mr. Brock filed for divorce, having
discovered that his wife had spent over $200,000 from his checking
account and had forged his signature on the quitclaim deed used at the
loan closing. In the divorce decree, Mrs. Brock transferred her interest
in the residence to Mr. Brock.20
In January 2005, Mr. Brock commenced a quiet title action against his
ex-wife and Yale Mortgage.2 1 Although Yale Mortgage did not dispute
that Mrs. Brock forged the quitclaim deed, Yale Mortgage answered,
asserted counterclaims and cross claims, and sought a court declaration
that it held a valid security interest in an undivided one-half interest in

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
287 Ga. 849, 700 S.E.2d 583 (2010).
Id. at 849-51, 700 S.E.2d at 584-86.
Id. at 849, 851, 700 S.E.2d at 585-86.
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the property.22 In 2006, Yale Mortgage amended its claims seeking "a
declaration that its security interest extended to the entire property."23
The trial court granted Yale Mortgage's motion for summary judgment,
finding that it held a one-half, undivided interest in the property. Upon
filing its subsequent claim to the entirety of the property, Yale Mortgage
moved for clarification. After reconsideration, the trial court declared
that Yale Mortgage's interest in the property extended to the entire

property.24

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order that Yale
Mortgage's security interest in the property extended to at least a onehalf, undivided interest in the property.25 The supreme court did not,
however, hold that Yale Mortgage's interest extended to the entire
property.26 In its opinion, the court discussed the difference between
cancelling a deed and setting aside a security interest on account of
forgery.27 Georgia law provides that a forged deed may be cancelled,"2
but forgery does not invalidate a subsequent security deed." Because
a tenant in common may encumber his own interest without consent of
a cotenant, if that tenant in common then conveys an interest in the
entirety, the transferring deed will affect his interest, but not the
interest of the nonconsenting cotenant."
Importantly, the supreme court, in Brock, overruled Bonner v. Norwest
Bank,' which held that lenders who had foreclosed a security interest
and purchased the collateral property out of foreclosure held proper title
to the property even though the deed purporting to convey the property
to the borrowers was a forgery.32 Specifically, the court, in Brock, held
that the cases relied upon in Bonner could not support the holding "that
a bona fide purchaser for value, or a security deed holder occupying such
position, obtains good title notwithstanding a forgery in the chain of

22. Id. at 850-51, 700 S.E.2d at 585-86.
23. Id. at 851, 700 S.E.2d at 586.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 851-52, 700 S.E.2d at 586.
27. Id. at 852, 700 S.E.2d at 586-87.
28. O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40 (1982).
29. Brock, 287 Ga. at 851, 700 S.E.2d at 586.
30. Id.
31. 275 Ga. 620, 571 S.E.2d 387 (2002).
32. Brock, 287 Ga. at 853, 700 S.E.2d at 587 (citing Bonner, 275 Ga. at 621, 571 S.E.2d
at 388).

2011]1

REAL PROPERTY

313

title." With this ruling, the supreme court also overruled Mabra v.
Deutsche Bank,' which had followed the Bonner precedent.
Further, the court disagreed with Yale Mortgage's argument that Mr.
Brock had ratified the loan agreement by the terms of the divorce decree
because Mr. Brock was not a party to the loan agreement and, therefore,
could not ratify the terms therein. 36 The court also held that even
though Mr. Brock received a benefit from the payoff of the previous
mortgage, accepting the benefits of the payoff would act to ratify the
agreement only if he had full knowledge of the material facts. The
sole evidence before the court was that the refinance was done, and the
prior loan satisfied, without Mr. Brock's knowledge.3 ' The supreme
court concluded that the trial court had it right the first time-that the
mortgage company maintained only a one-half interest in the property.39
Rector, Wardens & Vestryman of Christ Church in Savannah v. Bishop
of the Episcopal Diocese of Georgia, Inc." was one of several cases
during the survey period that analyzed ownership of church property
when a local congregation splits with its national governing body."
Christ Church was founded in colonial Georgia in 1733. Title to the
property was "vested in Christ Church by act of the provincial legislature in 1758."" The legislative land grant was again confirmed by the
Georgia General Assembly in 1789, establishing title to the real estate
in the wards and vestrymen of the church.4 In 2007, the Diocese of
Georgia filed suit against Christ Church, its rector, and members of the
vestry, seeking a declaration that all property of Christ Church was
owned by the Diocese and requesting that the court permanently enjoin
Christ Church from using any church funds for anything other than that
permitted by the canons of the diocese.4 5 The heart of the suit was
"whether the church property [was] impressed with a trust in favor of

33. Id.
34. 277 Ga. App. 764, 627 S.E.2d 849 (2006).
35. Brock, 287 Ga. at 853, 700 S.E.2d at 587.
36. Id. at 854, 700 S.E.2d at 588.
37. Id. at 855, 700 S.E.2d at 588-89.
38. Id. at 850, 700 S.E.2d at 585.
39. Id. at 851, 700 S.E.2d at 586.
40. 305 Ga. App. 87,699 S.E.2d 45 (2010), affd, No. S10G1909, 2011 WL 5830140 (Ga.
Nov. 21, 2011).
41. Id. at 87, 699 S.E.2d at 47.
42. Id. at 89, 699 S.E.2d at 48.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 89, 699 S.E.2d at 49.
45. Legal Q & A Top 10 Questions, CHRISTCHURCHSAVANNAH, http://www.christchurch
savannah.org/Legal/Legal-FAQ.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
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Both parties sought summary
the National Episcopal Church."
judgment and the trial court granted the National Episcopal Church's
motion and denied Christ Church's motion, "finding that even though the
parish ownled] its real estate, the discipline, canons, and constitutions
of the National Episcopal Church and the Diocese of Georgia established
an implied and express trust over the property for the use of the
National Episcopal Church." 7
In rendering its decision, the Georgia Court of Appeals recognized
that, while it is not proper for courts to intervene in doctrinal disputes
within a church, civil courts are authorized to enforce the rights of the
parties when a church property dispute can be resolved outside of
doctrinal disputes.4 8 To reach a decision, the court must consider
whether the underlying church government is congregational or
hierarchal.4 9 Georgia law defines a congregational church as one that
"is strictly independent of other ecclesiastic associations and owes no
fealty or obligation to any higher church government authority.""o In
a congregational church, the church members themselves control
decisions and property." However, a hierarchical church is part of a
larger organization of "churches having similar faith and doctrine with
a common ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head."" Where church
governance is hierarchal in nature, the court is required to use "neutral
principles of law" to determine property ownership, which includes "state
statutes, corporate charters, relevant deeds, and the organizational
constitutions and bylaws of the denomination.""
The court of appeals determined that the governance of Christ Church
was hierarchal in nature and that neutral principles of law were
applicable." The court therefore looked to the historical land grant to
Christ Church, state statutes, and governing church documents to
determine whether a trust existed in favor of the National Episcopal
Church."
The court held that the historical land grant did not establish a trust
because Christ Church took title to the property long before the
existence of the Diocese of Georgia and before the National Church came

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Christ Church, 305 Ga. App. at 87, 699 S.E.2d at 47.
Id. at 87-88, 699 S.E.2d at 47.
Id. at 88, 699 S.E.2d at 47-48.
Id. at 88, 699 S.E.2d at 48.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 89, 699 S.E.2d at 48.
Id.
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to Georgia." However, the court determined that the current statute
provided that churches are subject to the Georgia Nonprofit Corporation
Code," and that Christ Church and the church property were "subject
to the same provisions, conditions, and limitations as any other
incorporated church."" Moreover, when Christ Church joined with the
National Episcopal Church in 1823, Christ Church subjected itself to the
statutes then in place so that "'the mode of church government [and]
rules of discipline' of the National Episcopal Church established a
trust."" The court also considered the church's governing documents,
including the original charter of Christ Church and subsequent
amendments.o Although those documents did not create an implied
trust, when Christ Church became a parish of the Georgia Diocese in
1823, it, along with other joining churches, promised "'unqualified
accession' to the National Episcopal Church's constitution, canons, and
discipline [,]" including the National Episcopal Church's articles of
association." The result was that Christ Church became subject to the
"usual disciplines" of the national body." Further, in 1918, Christ
Church, in its amended charter, confirmed its accession to the Georgia
Diocese and the National Episcopal Church. Therefore, the evidence
showed that Christ Church was a full participant in the Georgia Diocese
and the National Episcopal Church from 1823 until at least 2006, and
by agreeing to accept admission to the national body and agreeing to be
governed by the Georgia Diocese and National Episcopal Church, an
implied trust was created.6 4
Furthermore, Christ Church, as a member of the diocese, had acceded
to the national body's express trust in church property because the
General Convention of the National Episcopal Church adopted the Trust
Canon of 1979, which stated that "all parish real and personal property
is held in trust for the National Episcopal Church and its dioceses."'
However, note that this matter may very well be a part of a future
survey of Georgia real property law, since the Georgia Supreme Court

56.
57.

Id. at 89-90, 699 S.E.2d at 49.
O.C.G.A. §§ 14-5-40 to -51 (2003 & Supp. 2011).

58.
59.
60.
61.

Christ Church, 305 Ga. App. at 90-91, 699 S.E.2d at 49-50.
Id. at 91, 699 S.E.2d at 50; O.C.G.A. § 14-5-46 (2003).
Christ Church, 305 Ga. App. at 92, 699 S.E.2d at 50.
Id.

62. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
63.

Id. at 93, 669 S.E.2d at 50-51.

64. Id. at 93-94, 699 S.E.2d at 50-51.
65. Id. at 95, 699 S.E.2d at 52.
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after granting certiorari issued a lengthy, detailed opinion affirming the
court of appeals.r
Kemp v. Neal6 is another case where the Georgia Supreme Court
considered ownership of church property claimed by both the local
parishioners and the national church body." A dispute arose between
the trustees of the Williams Chapel African Methodist Episcopal Church
(Williams Chapel) and the National African Methodist Episcopal Church
(the National Church) over the ownership of church property. However,
unlike Christ Church, there was no land grant, deed of record, or other
instrument conveying real property to either the local congregants or the
national body, and no body of historical documents regarding the
relationship between the local and National Church.6"
In 2008, Williams Chapel sought to terminate its relationship with the
National Church. In response, the National Church filed a petition to
quiet title, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. After
a final hearing, the trial court found that Williams Chapel had
permissive use of the property, holding it in trust for the benefit of the
National Church and, granting additional equitable relief, ordered that
all property of Williams Chapel, including all bank, mortgage, insurance,
and other accounts, be delivered to the National Church. The trustees
of Williams Chapel appealed."
The supreme court, like the court of appeals in Christ Church,
recognized that the First Amendment" limits the role courts play in
resolving church property disputes, noting that courts must use "neutral
principals of law," such as deeds of conveyance and the constitutions and
bylaws of the denomination to resolve disputes.72 Accordingly, the
supreme court looked to the property title records and noted that there
was no deed transferring title to the property to either litigant." The
absence of a deed conveying the property limited the governance of the
issues by statute, and in the absence of a deed of conveyance, the court
turned to the "Book of Discipline, the governing ecclesiastical doctrine
and constitution of the AME church . .. [which] provides that 'the title(s)
to all real, personal, and mixed property held . .. by the local churches,
shall be held IN TRUST for the [national] African Methodist Episcopal

66.

No. S10G1909, 2011 WL5830140 (Ga. Nov. 21, 2011).

67. 288 Ga. 324, 704 S.E.2d 175 (2010).
68.

Id. at 324, 704 S.E.2d at 177.

69. Id.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 324-25, 704 S.E.2d at 177.
U.S. CONST. amend I.
Kemp, 288 Ga. at 326, 704 S.E.2d at 178-79 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 326-27, 704 S.E.2d at 179.
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Church, Inc., and subject to the provisions of [the Book of Discipline].
The supreme court then analyzed whether there was another theory
that Williams Chapel could rely on to support its claim to the church
property." The supreme court held that a claim based upon adverse
possession would not lie because, even though Williams Chapel had used
the property for over seventy years, it did so with the permission of the
National Church." Permissive use of the property, even given the
length of time of its use, "cannot be the foundation of a prescription until
an adverse claim and actual notice to the other party."" There was no
evidence that Williams Chapel gave notice of an adverse claim to the
property to the National Church prior to the suit, so a claim of
However, it was undisputed that
prescriptive title also failed."
Williams Chapel obtained the land upon which the church stood through
a gift."9 Obtaining the land and then building the church upon it
created in equity "a good title even at law."o Therefore, based on that
gift of land, Williams Chapel held title to the property under the Book
of Discipline because the building of the church upon the gifted land
created title and having title created a trust referenced in the Book of
Discipline, and Williams Chapel held title in trust for the National
Church."
Williams Chapel next contended that, even if it held the property in
trust for the National Church, the trust was breached because the
National Church provided no support or benefits to the local congregants." However, the supreme court reasoned that there was no
neutral principle of law embodying that position, and because civil courts
"may not rely on doctrinal concerns or ecclesiastical principles when
deciding disputes between churches," the court held that the argument
was without merit."
Although Presiding Justice Carley concurred with the majority opinion
regarding the court's jurisdiction over the matter as an equity case, he
dissented from the majority's analysis that provisions of the Book of

74.

Id. at 327, 704 S.E.2d at 179 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted).

75.

Id.

76. Id.
77. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); O.C.G.A. § 44-5-161(b) (2010).
78. Kemp, 288 Ga. at 327, 704 S.E.2d at 179.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 327-28, 704 S.E.2d at 179 (quoting Sikes v. Seckinger, 164 Ga. 96, 103, 137
S.E. 833, 837 (1927)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. at 328, 704 S.E.2d at 179-80.
82. Id. at 329, 704 S.E.2d at 181.
83. Id. at 329-30, 704 S.E.2d at 181.
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Discipline, which were enacted decades after the church obtained title,
could act as a neutral principle of law upon which to determine title to
the real estate and other property." Justice Carley relied on the only
deed of record, a security deed evidencing the mortgage that burdened
the church property." The security deed was executed by the trustees
of Williams Chapel but did not expressly state that the property was
held in trust for the National Church." Justice Carley concluded that
the lengthy relationship between Williams Chapel and the National
Church, "without more, is insufficient to create an implied trust."" He
then examined the Discipline of the AME Church, which referred to title
to property." The Discipline clearly stated that all property was to be
held in trust for the National Church, but Justice Carley noted that the
church did not enact these trust provisions until 1972.9 Because
Williams Church obtained its title to the property decades before the
adoption of the trust provision of the Discipline, Justice Carley reasoned
that the majority should have considered the church constitution in place
at the time the church obtained title.90
IV.

SALE OF REAL PROPERTY9'

In JR Real Estate Development, LLC v. Cheeley Investment, L.R, 92a
buyer filed a lawsuit seeking specific performance, declaratory judgment,
and injunctive relief related to a land sale and purchase agreement.
In JR Real Estate, the buyer agreed to purchase 53.937 acres of land for
$5,933,070 with $100,000 paid as earnest money. The original closing
date was July 31, 2008, but a series of extensions occurred, one of which
included an additional payment of $50,000 in earnest money. As part
of a final extension of the closing date to November 14, 2008, an
amendment was executed lowering the purchase price to $5,735,000,

84. Id. at 330, 704 S.E.2d at 181 (Carley, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
85. Id. at 331, 704 S.E.2d at 182.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Coles v. Wilburn, 241 Ga. 322, 323, 245 S.E.2d 273, 274 (1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 331-32, 704 S.E.2d at 182.
91. This section was authored by Jonathan E. Green, associate at the law firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., 1998); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 2001). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
92. 309 Ga. App. 250, 709 S.E.2d 577 (2011).
93. Id. at 253, 709 S.E.2d at 580.
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providing for a payment of an additional $750,000 in earnest money and
making the sale contingent upon the rezoning of the property. The
amendment provided that, if the rezoning was denied, the earnest money
would be released without any further liability.94
The rezoning application was approved, but the buyer did not close on
the purchase of the real property. The purchaser filed suit for a
declaratory judgment, claiming that it was entitled to a return of the
$900,000 in earnest money. The seller filed a counterclaim seeking a
declaratory judgment that it was entitled to the earnest money. The
specific performance claim was ultimately dismissed. After the parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor
of the seller, awarding the $900,000 in earnest money as liquidated
damages. The purchaser appealed."
In
The court of appeals overturned the trial court's decision."
interpreting the contract, the court noted that the contract language
specified that the first $150,000 in earnest money was intended to be a
reasonable estimate of liquidated damages, rather than a penalty."
However, in regard to the $750,000 in additional earnest money, the
court noted that the amendment only specified that this sum constituted
earnest money for an additional sixty day extension on the closing."
Therefore, the court held that there was an issue of material fact as to
whether the additional $750,000 in earnest money was intended to be
liquidated damages."

In Hampton Island, LLC v. HAOP, LLC,'00 the Georgia Court of

Appeals examined a claim for specific performance for the purchase of
real property in an unusual situation. The dispute centered on two
pieces of land located on the Hampton Island Preserves in Liberty
County, Georgia. The plaintiff, HAOP, LLC (HAOP) purchased the
property in 2005 from South Hampton Island Preservation Properties,
LLC (South Hampton). As part of the sale, South Hampton agreed to
make certain improvements to the real property but failed to do so.
South Hampton then joined with various other business entities to form
Hampton Island, LLC (Hampton Island). HAOP sought damages from
Hampton Island for the breach of contract by South Hampton. Prior to
filing suit, HAOP and South Hampton entered into an agreement

94. Id. at 251-53, 709 S.E.2d at 579-80.
95. Id. at 253, 709 S.E.2d at 580.
96. Id. at 256, 709 S.E.2d at 582.
97. Id. at 254, 709 S.E.2d at 581.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 306 Ga. App. 542, 702 S.E.2d 770 (2010).
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whereby Hampton Island agreed to pay HAOP $1,000,000 in exchange
for title to the property and a release of all claims by HAOP. Hampton
Island failed to pay the sum to repurchase the property, and HAOP sued
Hampton Island for specific performance. The trial court granted
summary judgment to HAOP on the claim for specific performance, and
Hampton Island appealed.0 o
Hampton Island raised the following primary issues on appeal: (1) a
lack of consideration for the agreement; (2) the agreement was entered
as a result of duress; (3) HAOP had unclean hands and, therefore, was
not entitled to specific performance; (4) impossibility of performance; and
(5) that the trial court lacked equitable jurisdiction to grant specific
performance.102 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's
ruling. 103
First, the court of appeals noted that the transfer of title to the
property constituted adequate consideration for the agreement to pay
Second, with regard to the claim of duress, the court
$1,000,000.10o
held that no duress existed, declining to overturn binding precedent. 05
Specifically, the court found that there was no evidence of wrongful
actions.1o' Additionally, the court, citing Cooperative Resource Center
v. Southeast Rural Assistance Project,' held that, because Hampton
Island was controlled by sophisticated businessmen with access to legal
Next, analyzing the "unclean
counsel, there could be no duress.'
hands" argument, the court of appeals noted that HAOP had attempted
to induce third parties to forego doing business with Hampton IsHowever, the court held that the alleged misconduct was
land."1'
unrelated to the subject of the litigation and, therefore, could not bar
specific performance."0
In Office Depot, Inc. v. District at Howell Mill, LLC, 1 ' the court of
appeals examined a lawsuit brought by a tenant against a landlord for
breach of an exclusive-use provision.112 On December 27, 2005, the
tenant, Office Depot, Inc., leased commercial space in a shopping center

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 542-43, 702 S.E.2d at 771-73.
Id. at 543-48, 702 S.E.2d at 773-75.
Id. at 549, 702 S.E.2d at 776.
Id. at 544, 702 S.E.2d at 773.
Id. at 545-46, 702 S.E.2d at 774.
Id. at 545, 702 S.E.2d at 774.
256 Ga. App. 719, 569 S.E.2d 545 (2002).
Hampton Island, 306 Ga. App. at 544-45, 702 S.E.2d at 773-74.
Id. at 547, 702 S.E.2d at 775.
Id.
309 Ga. App. 525, 710 S.E.2d 685 (2011).
Id. at 525, 710 S.E.2d at 686.
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located on Howell Mill Road in Atlanta, Georgia, from The District at
Howell Mill, LLC (District). In the lease agreement, the District agreed
to an exclusive-use provision whereby the District would not enter into
a lease or operating agreement with any person or entity whose primary
business was the sale of school supplies. Eighteen months later, the
District leased space in the shopping center to The School Box, which
intended to utilize the premises, in part, for the sale of school supplies.
The School Box opened its store in November 2006.na At that time,
Office Depot apparently took no action concerning The School Box."'
In May 2007, ELPF Howell Mill, LLC agreed to purchase a majority
interest in the shopping center from the District. As part of the
transaction, ELPF requested an estoppel certificate from Office
On April 24, 2007, Office Depot executed an estoppel
Depot. 115
certificate stating that "[t]o Tenant's knowledge, Landlord is not in
default in the performance or observance of any of its obligations under
any terms or provisions of the Lease.""' In December 2007, Office
Depot gave notice to the District that its entering into a lease with The
School Box violated the exclusive-use provision of the lease and started
paying reduced rent pursuant to the lease. "
Office Depot then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a
declaration that the District and ELPF had breached the exclusive-use
provision. The District and ELPF counterclaimed for breach of contract.
The District and ELPF prevailed at summary judgment and Office Depot
appealed." 8
On appeal, the court of appeals first held that ELPF relied on the
estoppel certificate in its decision to close on the purchase of a partOffice Depot argued that the
interest in the shopping center."'
reliance was unreasonable because both ELPF and the District knew
that the exclusive-use provision had been violated." 0 The court of
appeals, however, observed that the testimony showed that both the
District and ELPF had examined the issue prior to the completion of the
sale and determined that leasing to The School Box had not violated the
exclusive-use provision.'"' Therefore, the court held that Office Depot

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 526-27, 710 S.E.2d at 686-87.
See id. at 526-27, 710 S.E.2d at 686-87.
Id. at 527, 710 S.E.2d at 687.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 528, 710 S.E.2d at 687.
Id. at 528, 710 S.E.2d at 688.
Id. at 528, 710 S.E.2d at 688.
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was estopped from claiming that the exclusive-use provision was

violated. 122
V.

123
TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY

As in years past, the purchase of real property at tax sales and the
valuation of property for tax purposes remain hot topics. In Brown

Investment Group, LLC v. Mayor & Alderman of Savannah,1 24 the
Georgia Supreme Court addressed whether a tax sale purchaser had
standing to maintain an action for trespass during the redemption

period. 121
On August 1, 2006, Brown Investment Group, LLC (Brown) obtained
title to a parcel of real property by tax deed. A vacant building on the
property was deemed unsafe by the City of Savannah and demolished on
July 25, 2007, during the redemption period.126 Brown sued "the
mayor and alderman of the City for the full value of the destroyed
building, alleging that the City failed to give it" proper notice prior to
the demolition.127 The trial court granted summary judgment for the
city, finding that Brown "failed to bar the right to redeem the property
and therefore, [had] no standing to seek damages against the [City] .,128
The court of appeals affirmed on other grounds, holding that "when the
building was demolished, the absolute 12 month right of redemption
under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40(1)129 had not expired and, as a result, Brown
held neither legal title nor the right of possession and therefore lacked
standing to sue the City for trespass."3 o
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review that
ruling."' The court stated that "[tlo maintain an action for trespass
or injury to realty, it is essential that the plaintiff show either that he
"~132
was the true owner or was in possession at the time of the trespass.

122. Id. at 529, 710 S.E.2d at 688.
123. This section was authored by Sarah-Nell H. Walsh, associate in the law firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Virginia (B.A., 2001); William and Mary School of Law (J.D., 2004). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
124. 289 Ga. 67, 709 S.E.2d 214 (2011).
125. Id. at 68, 709 S.E.2d at 215-16.
126. Id. at 67-68, 709 S.E.2d at 215.
127. Id. at 68, 709 S.E.2d at 215.
128. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40(1) (2010).
130. Brown Inv. Grp., 289 Ga. at 68, 709 S.E.2d at 215.
131. Id. at 68, 709 S.E.2d at 216.
132. Id. (quoting Coffin v. Barbaree, 214 Ga. 149, 151, 103 S.E.2d 557, 558 (1958))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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The court observed that, while "Brown's defeasible fee gave it both an
insurable interest in the property and sufficient interest therein to
require the City to provide it with notice of the demolition," recognition
of this legal interest was not inconsistent with the legal title held by the
Ultimately, the court held that "the tax
original property owner.'
sale purchaser during the time allowed for redemption does not have a
sufficient interest to recover the full value of the destroyed improvements and thereby prevent the defendant in fi. fa. as the true owner
from obtaining such a recovery."a 4

In Nuci Phillips Memorial Foundation,Inc. v. Athens Clarke County
Board of Tax Assessors,"' the county board of tax assessors challenged
a charitable organization's ad valorem tax exemption. The Nuci Phillips
Memorial Foundation, Inc. (Foundation), operates Nuci's Space, a facility
in Athens where musicians and others may obtain help for anxiety,
depression, and other mental health issues. The Foundation applied for
and was granted an exemption from ad valorem taxes for the property
on which its facility is located. The Athens Clarke County Board of Tax
Assessors unsuccessfully challenged the exemption in the trial court.'
The court of appeals reversed, holding that "since the Foundation rents
out rehearsal space as well as space for private birthday parties and
wedding receptions, then the Foundation does not use its property
exclusively in furtherance of its charitable pursuits as required by
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(d)(2)1" in order to qualify for an exemption from
ad valorem taxation."3
The supreme court granted certiorari to determine whether the court
of appeals correctly applied O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(d)(2). 3 9 The supreme
court held that, in order for an institution to be granted a property tax
exemption pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(aX4),140 it must meet four
qualifications. 141 First, the public charity must both own the property
and use it in its charitable purposes. 4 2 Second, the property must be

133. Id. at 69-70, 709 S.E.2d at 217.
134. Id. at 70, 709 S.E.2d at 217.
135. 288 Ga. 380, 703 S.E.2d 648 (2010).
136. Id. at 380, 703 S.E.2d at 649.
137. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(d)(2) (2010).
138. Nuci Phillips, 288 Ga. at 380, 703 S.E.2d 649.
139. Id.
140. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(4) (2010).
141. Nuci Phillips, 288 Ga. at 384-85, 703 S.E.2d at 652.
142. Id. at 384-85, 703 S.E.2d at 652 (quoting Thomas v. Ne. Ga. Council, Inc., Boy
Scouts of Am., 241 Ga. 291, 293, 244 S.E.2d 842, 844 (1978)) ("'Mere latent ownership of
property by an institution of public charity will not entitle it to an exemption . . . ").
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used exclusively for charitable purposes that benefit the public.'4 3
Third, the real estate or building's primary purpose cannot be to secure
income. 144 Fourth, the property cannot raise income distributable to
shareholders or other owners of the property.145 Once the institution
has met these four qualifications, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(dX2) allows
property to "be used for the purpose of securing income so long as such
income is used exclusively for the operation of that charitable institution," provided that such institution is exempt from taxation pursuant
to section 501(cX3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 4 1
Because the Foundation is a 501(cX3) charity, owns the property,
devotes the property entirely to charitable purposes that benefit the
public, and rents space solely to raise funds for the organization's
charitable services, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals and
held that the Foundation qualifies for an exemption from ad valorem
taxation under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(dX2). 4 1
In City of Atlanta v. Clayton County Board of Tax Assessors,4 s the
City of Atlanta (City) sought review of a decision by the county board of
equalization that found certain parcels of land leased to a common
carrier airline were not exempt from ad valorem taxes. The City
appealed the superior court's order that granted summary judgment to
the Clayton County Board of Tax Assessors, holding that five parcels of
property leased by the City to Delta Air Lines, Inc., at HartsfieldJackson Atlanta International Airport were not exempt from ad valorem
taxes in 2005. The parcels contain hangars and maintenance facilities
for servicing aircraft and engines, a ground support equipment building,
a building to handle cargo, and two flight kitchens."' The issue in
dispute was whether, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 6-3-20 to -21,15o the five
"151
parcels are "actively used for a public or governmental purpose.
According to O.C.G.A. § 6-3-20 property is "'acquired, owned, leased,

143. Id. at 385, 703 S.E.2d at 652 (citing Bd. of Equalization v. York Rite Bodies of
Freemasonry, 209 Ga. App. 359, 360, 433 S.E.2d 299, 301 (1993)) ("denying exemption to
a Masonic lodge because it also devoted numerous resources to pursuits that benefited only
its members").
144. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(dXl) (2010).
145. Nuci Phillips, 288 Ga. at 385, 703 S.E.2d at 652; see also O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(c)
(2010).
146. Nuci Phillips,288 Ga. at 382, 703 S.E.2d at 650; O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(dXl); I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (2006).
147. Nuci Phillips,288 Ga. at 387, 703 S.E.2d at 653.
148. 306 Ga. App. 381, 702 S.E.2d 704 (2011).
149. Id. at 381, 702 S.E.2d at 704-05.
150. O.C.G.A. §§ 6-3-20 to -21 (1995).
151. City of Atlanta v. Clayton Cnty., 306 Ga. App. at 382, 702 S.E.2d at 705.
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controlled, or occupied for public, governmental, and municipal purposes'
if it is used 'to acquire, establish, construct, expand, own, lease, control,
equip, improve, maintain, operate, regulate, and police airports and
landing fields for the use of aircraft."'" 5 2 The court of appeals concluded that the five parcels were exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(1)B)(i)." because they were "reasonably and
uniformly used for the public convenience and welfare to facilitate the
154
effective operation of the Airport."
In In re Waddy, 1' the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Georgia addressed "whether the Fulton County Tax
Commissioner has a valid unsecured priority tax claim for taxes assessed
pre[lpetition against real property owned by the debtor, when stay relief
as to the real property has been granted to the holder of the security
deed on the property.""' Under a plain reading of Title 48 of the
5
the debtor remains personally liable for the taxes assessed
O.C.G.A.,s'
prepetition because "ad valorem taxes are chargeable either as a
personal debt of the taxpayer or as a lien . . . ."1s Based on this, the
bankruptcy court held that the debtor is personally liable for the real
property taxes assessed against the property prior to the filing of the
Chapter 131s9 petition.6 o In so holding, the bankruptcy court was
unpersuaded by the debtor's equitable argument that she should not be
liable for the taxes on the property due to the lender's failure to foreclose
on the property since the granting of stay relief.11
VI.

EASEMENTS, COVENANTS, AND BOUNDARIES

In LN West Paces Ferry Associates, LLC v. McDonald,1 62 the Georgia
Court of Appeals considered the damages that can be awarded when
crossing a neighbor's property line.1 63 Najjar and McDonald were

152. Id.; O.C.G.A. §§ 6-3-20 to -21.
153. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(1)(BXi) (2010).
154. City of Atlanta v. Clayton Cnty., 306 Ga. App. at 385, 702 S.E.2d at 707 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
155. No. 09 64634 WLH, 2010 WL 4881677 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 2010).
156. Id. at *1.
157. O.C.G.A. tit. 48, chs. 1-6 (2010 & Supp. 2011).
158. In re Waddy, 2010 WL 4881677, at *2 (quoting Mulligan v. Sec. Bank of Bibb
Cnty., 280 Ga. App. 248, 249, 633 S.E.2d 629, 631 (2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
159. 11 U.S.C. ch. 13 (2006).
160. In re Waddy, 2010 WL 4881677, at *1.
161. Id. at *3.
162. 306 Ga. App. 641, 703 S.E.2d 85 (2010).
163. Id. at 643, 703 S.E.2d at 89.
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neighbors. Najjar constructed a 30,000 square foot residence but
discovered that the residence was not connected to a sewer line nor did
it have a septic tank. Najjar determined that McDonald's property had
private access to the sewer via a manhole in McDonald's yard, which
was located 220 feet beyond the boundary of Najjar's property. Although
Najjar left a voicemail message for McDonald requesting permission for
a tie-in to the sewer, he did not submit plans showing the location of the
desired easement as McDonald's attorney requested. Instead, without
obtaining permission, Najjar instructed his plumbing contractor to tie
into the manhole on McDonald's property. The contractor refused but
ran a hookup that stopped at the property boundary. Najjar then had
other laborers dig a trench and tie into the sewer line on McDonald's
property. When McDonald discovered the tie-in, he brought suit,
Najjar countered,
asserting claims for trespass and ejectment.1 "
asserting "the existence of and his entitlement to a sewer easement
extending from his property to McDonald's manhole . . . ."

Najjar

also sought a declaratory judgment for breach of quiet title to the
easement, tortious interference with the easement, and a permanent
injunction prohibiting McDonald from extinguishing the easement. A
jury found for McDonald, awarding compensatory and punitive damages
and attorney fees, and Najjar appealed. On appeal, Najjar argued that
the evidence did not support the jury's finding of intentional trespass
The court of appeals
sufficient to support an award of damages."
affirmed the verdict, holding that when Najjar trespassed onto McDonThe court
ald's property, he willfully interfered with the property.'
relied upon O.C.G.A. § 51-9-1,118 which states that "[t]he right of
enjoyment of private property being an absolute right of every citizen,
every act of another which unlawfully interferes with such enjoyment is
a tort for which an action shall lie,"' to establish that McDonald
could recover compensatory damages and, moreover, that punitive
damages could "be awarded for a trespass that reflects 'an intentional
disregard of the rights of another."'o

164. Id. at 641-42, 703 S.E.2d at 87-89.
165. Id. at 642, 703 S.E.2d at 89.
166. Id. at 641-43, 703 S.E.2d at 88-89.
167. Id. at 645, 703 S.E.2d at 90.
168. O.C.G.A. § 51-9-1 (2000).
169. McDonald, 306 Ga. App. at 643, 703 S.E.2d at 89 (internal quotation marks
omitted); O.C.G.A. § 51-9-1.
170. McDonald, 306 Ga. App. at 643, 703 S.E.2d at 89 (quoting Tyler v. Lincoln, 272
Ga. 118, 120, 527 S.E.2d 180, 182-83 (2000)).
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Najjar also "argueld] that he was an innocent, as opposed to wilful,
The court of appeals, therefore, reviewed the innocent
trespasser."'
trespasser doctrine, which "protects individuals who enter the land of
another under the mistaken belief that it is permissible to do so.
The trial record reflected that the jury was charged by the court on the
innocent trespasser doctrine, but the jury chose to reject that defense.17 ' The court of appeals found that the jury was entitled to find
willful trespass based upon the evidence "that Najjar directed the
construction of the sewer [line] across McDonald's property knowing that
he had neither a written easement nor permission from McDonald to do
Upon establishing willful trespass, the jury was then entitled
so."'
7
to award both compensatory damages and punitive damages. 1
Further, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11,176 the intentional tort of
trespass authorized an award of attorney fees. 77
Turning from trespass under the ground to property rights in the sky,
the court in Weinstock v. Novare Group, Inc. considered the rights
and remedies of high-rise condominium dwellers faced with finding their
city views blocked by new construction.' 79 Weinstock bought a condominium from Novare at "Twelve," a high-rise, mixed-use building in
Atlanta's Atlantic Station."o Part of the inducement to buy condominiums at Twelve was the advertisement by Novare that the building had
"spectacular city views."' 8' Weinstock contended that Novare advertised the views while intending to block them by later constructing an
adjacent forty-six-story tower. He sued Novare alleging, among other
things, breach of implied easement right, negligent misrepresentation,

171. Id.
172. Id. at 644, 703 S.E.2d at 89 (quoting Bullard v. Bouler, 272 Ga. App. 397, 399, 612
S.E.2d 513, 516 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Id. at 644, 703 S.E.2d at 90.
174. Id. at 645, 703 S.E.2d at 90.
175. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-9-3 (2000) (authorizing damages against a trespasser);
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b) (2000 & Supp. 2011) (authorizing punitive damages upon a finding
of willful misconduct).
176. O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (2010).
177. McDonald, 306 Ga. App. at 645, 703 S.E.2d at 90.
178. 309 Ga. App. 351, 710 S.E.2d 150 (2011).
179. Id. at 351, 710 S.E.2d at 152. Other purchasers and residents of Twelve Atlantic
Station brought similar but separate suits. See Novare Gp., Inc. v. Sarif, S11G0478, 2011
WL 5830488 (Ga. Nov. 21, 2011). In Novare, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the court of appeals and noted that there was no inconsistency with the court
of appeals rulings in Weinstock and Novare because Weinstock was decided on a fully
developed record, while Novare was decided on the pleadings. Id. at *1 & n.3.
180. Id.
18 1. Id.
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and fraud in the inducement. The trial court granted summary
judgment to Novare on all claims. "'
While the court of appeals extensively discussed Weinstock's tort and
contract allegations, for the purposes of this real property survey, it is
the court's discussion of the allegations of breach of implied easement
rights that is relevant. Weinstock's claims rested upon the theory that
his implied easement rights, set out in O.C.G.A. § 44-9-2,183 were
breached by the subsequent construction of the neighboring highrise.184 Specifically, Weinstock pointed to the fact that Novare destroyed the "spectacular city views" it had advertised to the purchasers
of condominium units in Twelve by constructing the nearby highrise."' The key to the court's decision as to the implied easement was
that the new construction was nearby, but not adjoining Twelve, as it
was undisputed that Twelve and the new construction were separated
by 17th Street."' Therefore, Weinstock was not entitled to an easement to light and air since the rights contemplated in O.C.G.A. § 44-9-2
arise only when "a person sells a house and the light necessary for the
reasonable enjoyment thereof is derived from and across adjoining land
belonging to such person."a7 The court of appeals therefore held that
"an implied easement under O.C.G.A. § 44-9-2 could not arise. . . .
89
the court also
Citing Savannah Jaycees Foundation,Inc. v. Gottlieb,1
held that claims to the general right of free passage of light and air
would not lie because the record failed to show a "malevolent purpose"
by Novare in blocking the passage of light and air.190
Typically cases involving subdivision covenants involve a homeowners
association or other governing group enforcing restrictions. However, in
Waller v. Golden,' the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed the opposite-a homeowners association that ignored the provisions of its own
restrictive covenant.' 92 The Goldens resided in the Eagles Landing
Country Club community, which is governed by a restrictive covenant
that limits the construction of swimming pools. The Goldens submitted

182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 44-9-2 (2002).
Weinstock, 309 Ga. App. at 358, 710 S.E.2d at 157.
Id. at 351, 358, 708 S.E.2d at 152, 157.

186.

Id.

187.
188.
189.
190.
at 379,
191.
192.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); O.C.G.A. § 44-9-2.
Weinstock, 309 Ga. App. at 358-59, 710 S.E.2d at 157.
273 Ga. App. 374, 615 S.E.2d 226 (2005).
Weinstock, 309 Ga. App. at 359, 710 S.E.2d at 157 (quoting Gottlieb, 273 Ga. App.
615 S.E.2d at 231).
288 Ga. 595, 706 S.E.2d 403 (2011).
Id. at 595, 706 S.E.2d at 404-05.
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a proposal to the community's Architectural Review Board to build a pool
adjacent to their home. Neither the Goldens nor the Architectural
Review Board were aware of the restriction in the covenants, and the
building plans were approved on August 7, 2009. Relying upon the
approval, the Goldens entered into a contract to build the pool, made
partial payment for the construction, and construction commenced.
When the neighbors realized a pool was under construction, they
objected to the Goldens and then to the homeowners association (HOA).
The HOA met to address the issue, and although the pool was not in
compliance with the community restrictions, the HOA allowed the
construction to continue, fearing a lawsuit if the Goldens were forced to
stop construction. Additionally, to minimize any negative effect on the
community aesthetic, the HOA decided to pay the Goldens up to $4,000
for the purchase and planting of mature shrubbery to shield the pool
from view. To the dismay of the neighbors, the pool construction
continued, and the neighbors met and consulted an attorney. On August
31, 2009, the Wallers sent the Goldens a letter demanding that the
construction stop. The Wallers then filed suit on September 3, 2009,
seeking an injunction against further construction, removal of the pool,
attorney fees, damages for injury to property values, and a return of the
funds the HOA had provided.'13 By the time the suit was filed, the
Goldens had already paid their contractor $19,864 of the total $39,500
construction fee.1 94 The construction continued, and the Goldens spent
another $8,022 towards completion.195
On September 18, 2009, the trial court granted a temporary injunction
on further construction. On December 17, 2009, the trial court entered
a final judgment denying the Wallers' claims on the basis of the doctrine
of laches. Following the decision, the Wallers did not seek supersedeas,
and the Goldens recommenced construction, completing the pool on
January 15, 2010. The Wallers appealed, contending that the trial court
erred in determining that their action for injunction was barred."'
The first hurdle the Wallers faced was the appellate review standard
for laches: "[Tihe question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court, and on appeal the exercise of that discretion will not
be disturbed unless it is so clearly wrong as to amount to an abuse of
The Wallers contended that their verbal objection to the
discretion."'

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
258 Ga.

Id. at 595-96, 706 S.E.2d at 404-05.
See id.
Id. at 596, 706 S.E.2d at 405.
Id. at 596-97, 706 S.E.2d at 405-06.
Id. at 597, 706 S.E.2d at 406 (alteration in original) (quoting McClure v. Davidson,
706, 708, 373 S.E.2d 617, 620 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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pool was sufficient to show that they did not unreasonably delay
asserting their rights, but "[a] mere objection or protest, or a mere threat
to take legal proceedings, is not sufficient to exclude the consequences
of laches or acquiescence."' 9 '
On appeal, the Wallers relied on Hech v. Summit Oaks Owners
Ass'nse and King v. Baker,200 each of which were distinguishable
because those cases involved activity that proceeded without permission
from the respective governing bodies.20 1 The supreme court noted that,
in this case, the Goldens received permission from the Architectural
Review Board to build the pool and were reassured by the HOA to
continue the construction after the HOA heard the neighbors concerns. 2 02 Finally, the supreme court held that the trial court was
correct in denying the Wallers' claims against the HOA Board members."0 In reviewing the HOA's actions, the proper consideration was
"whether the exercise of [the association's] authority was procedurally
fair and reasonable, and whether the substantive decision was made in
good faith, and is reasonable and not arbitrary and capricious. 204
Finding that the HOA acted in good faith, the supreme court affirmed
the trial court's order. 205
VII.

TRESPASS AND NUISANCE 2 06

In Landings Ass'n v. Williams,"' the Georgia Court of Appeals,

among other things, clarified the scope of private nuisance in Georgia,
indicating that a person who suffers hurt, inconvenience, or damage on
another's property cannot, as a matter of law, prevail on a private
nuisance claim against the property owner.2 08 In Williams, the estate
and heirs (estate) of a fatally injured alligator-attack victim brought an
action against the organizations that owned the property on which the

198. Id. at 598, 706 S.E.2d at 406 (alteration in original) (quoting Holt v. Parsons, 118
Ga. 895, 899, 45 S.E. 690, 692 (1903)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. 275 Ga. App. 265, 620 S.E.2d 490 (2005).
200. 214 Ga. App. 229, 447 S.E.2d 129 (1994).
201. Waller, 288 Ga. at 598, 706 S.E.2d at 406.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 599, 706 S.E.2d at 407.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. This section was authored by Jennifer L. Ervin, associate in the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., in Atlanta, Georgia. Clark Atlanta
University (B.A., 2005); Northwestern University School of Law (J.D., 2010). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
207. 309 Ga. App. 321, 711 S.E.2d 294 (2011).
208. Id. at 330, 711 S.E.2d at 301.

2011]

REAL PROPERTY

331

attack occurred, alleging premises liability and nuisance. The trial court
denied the property owners' motions for summary judgment on the
estate's nuisance claim, and the owners sought an interlocutory appeal
of the trial court's decision. On appeal, one of the owners argued that
there was no evidence from which a jury could find that it maintained
a nuisance.2 09 The court of appeals agreed, holding that summary
judgment for the owners was proper because the estate did not allege in
its complaint that "anything generated by the owners' activities on [the
owners'] property invaded the [estate's] property and thereby infringed
on [the estate's] right of peaceful enjoyment.""'o The court reasoned
that, as an initial matter, Georgia nuisance law is "grounded in the
fundamental premise that everyone has the right to use his or her
property as he or she sees fit, provided that in so doing the owner or
occupier does not unreasonably invade the corresponding right of others
to use their own property as they see fit."21 ' The court also noted that
a private nuisance may exist when an owner or occupier's activity on
its real property generates an unreasonable amount or type of smoke,
noxious odors, water, noise, or something else that invades the real
property of another, causing damage to the property, injury to a person
on the property, or other harm.212
Relying on this reasoning, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's
decision to deny the owners' motion for summary judgment and held
that the property's owners did not create a private nuisance.213
In Alexander v. Hulsey Environmental Services, Inc.,214 the Georgia
Court of Appeals clarified the scope of a Georgia statute that was passed
to protect certain existing agricultural facilities from nuisance lawsuits
brought by newly adjacent landowners.2 15 In Alexander, landowners
owning property adjacent to a waste disposal facility brought a nuisance
claim against the facility and the facility's CEO, site manager, and a
customer of the waste disposal facility (facility defendants). The facility
defendants moved for summary judgment on the landowners' claim, and
after a hearing, the trial court denied summary judgment to the facility
but granted summary judgment to the remaining facility defendants.
On
The landowners appealed, and the facility cross appealed. 1

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 324-25, 711 S.E.2d at 295-97.
Id. at 330, 711 S.E.2d at 301.
Id. at 329, 711 S.E.2d at 301.
Id. at 329-30, 711 S.E.2d at 301.
Id. at 330, 711 S.E.2d at 301.
306 Ga. App. 459, 702 S.E.2d 435 (2010).
Id. at 462-63, 702 S.E.2d at 439; see also O.C.G.A. § 41-1-7 (1997 & Supp. 2011).
Alexander, 306 Ga. App. at 459, 702 S.E.2d at 437.
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appeal, the facility argued that the landowners' nuisance action was
barred by O.C.G.A. § 41-1-7,217 which protects only "certain existing
In asserting this argument, the facility
agricultural facilities . . . ."
suggested that it was an "agricultural facility" as defined under the
statute. 2 19 However, the court of appeals refused to adopt this suggestion, concluding that a waste disposal facility was not covered under the
statute. 2 20 Ultimately, the court held that O.C.G.A. § 41-1-7 "does not
extend to protect the commercial receipt, storage and treatment of
septage and grease"-activities in which the waste disposal facility
engaged. 221 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision and
denied summary judgment to the facility.2 22
In a dispute over a property line, the Georgia Court of Appeals, in

Wright v. VIFIValentine Farms Building One, LLC, 223 discussed the
extent to which trespass liability can be based on prior ownership. 224
In Wright, a landowner brought an action for trespass against the prior
owners of property adjacent to the landowner's property, the alleged
trespassers who developed the adjacent property, and the subsequent
purchaser/occupant of the adjacent property.225 The landowner filed
a second complaint alleging that the prior owners were liable for
trespasses even though they had sold the property before the trespasses
occurred. 2 26 The prior owners moved for summary judgment, which
the trial court granted. The landowner appealed, contending that
summary judgment was in error because there were disputed material
facts and the trial court failed to follow controlling precedent. 22 7
On appeal, the landowners relied on Whitaker Acres, Inc. v. Schrenk, 228 arguing that the prior owners were subject to liability. 22 9 In
that case, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the selling of property
one does not own to others who then trespass on that land is a basis for

217. O.C.G.A. § 41-1-7 (1997 & Supp. 2011).
218. Alexander, 306 Ga. App. at 462, 702 S.E.2d at 439 (quoting Herrin v. Opatut, 248
Ga. 140, 140-41, 281 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
219. Id. at 462-63, 702 S.E.2d at 439.
220. Id. at 463, 702 S.E.2d at 439; see O.C.G.A. § 41-1-7.
221. Alexander, 306 Ga. App. at 463, 702 S.E.2d at 439.
222. Id.
223. 308 Ga. App. 436, 708 S.E.2d 41 (2011).
224. Id. at 436, 708 S.E.2d at 42.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 438, 702 S.E.2d at 44.
227. Id.
228. 170 Ga. App. 238, 316 S.E.2d 537 (1984).
229. Wright, 308 Ga. App. at 438, 708 S.E.2d at 44.

2011]

REAL PROPERTY

333

Based on the court's decision in Schrenk, the court of
liability.o3
appeals reversed the trial court, holding that there were genuine issues
of fact as to whether the prior owners knew or should have known of the
Ultimately, the court found that it is
boundary line disputes.2 31
possible for a grantor, by that status alone, to be ipso facto liable in tort
for trespasses of his grantee. 232
In another action for trespass, Richardson v. Georgia Power Co.,2 33
the Georgia Court of Appeals held a landowner liable for trespassing on
his own property, which was encumbered by an easement owned by a
utility company.234 After the landowner had begun building a garage
on a section of his property encumbered by the easement, the utility
company sued for injunctive relief and attorney fees for bad faith and
stubborn litigiousness. The trial court granted the injunction ordering
the landowner to remove the garage from the easement. The trial court
denied summary judgment, however, on the utility company's request for
attorney fees.235 The landowner appealed, and the appellate court
affirmed the decision.3
On appeal, the landowner argued that the trial court erred in finding
that he trespassed by constructing a building on his own property
"because an owner cannot trespass on his own property."237 The
appellate court agreed with the landowner's argument to the extent that
he owned the property and had a right to enter it and enjoy it; however,
the appellate court added that this right was subject to terms of the
easement.238 Indeed, as used in the context of this case, "a 'trespass'
upon an easement means use of the property in violation of the
easement terms."239 This case is important because it illustrates that
even a landowner can trespass on his own property when that property
is subject to another's property right.

230.
538).
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 439, 702 S.E.2d at 44 (citing Whitaker, 170 Ga. App. at 239, 316 S.E.2d at
Id. at 439-40, 702 S.E.2d at 44-45.
See id. at 441, 702 S.E.2d at 45.
308 Ga. App. 341, 708 S.E.2d 10 (2011).
Id. at 344, 708 S.E.2d at 13.
Id. at 341, 708 S.E.2d at 11.
Id.
Id. at 343, 708 S.E.2d at 12.
Id.
Id.
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FORECLOSURE OF REAL PROPERTY2 40

With the slump in real estate market values and the increasing
frequency of foreclosures involving mortgages with substantial deficiencies, confirmation of foreclosure, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161,241
has become an increasingly popular topic for the Georgia appellate
courts.
In Titshaw v. Northeast Georgia Bank,2 42 a foreclosure sale was
conducted by Freedom Bank, which then reported the sales to a superior
court judge and applied for confirmation. Subsequently, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed receiver for
Freedom Bank and the note and guaranties at issue in the confirmation
were transferred to Northeast Georgia Bank. As a result, Northeast
Georgia Bank pursued and obtained confirmation. The borrower and
guarantors appealed the confirmation order, arguing, in part, that
Northeast Georgia Bank was not the proper party.4 The confirmation
statute specifies that the "person instituting the foreclosure proceedings
shall" pursue confirmation.2 44 While the confirmation statute is in
derogation of common law, the Georgia Court of Appeals opted not to
strictly apply the cited provision because of the following reasoning:
While the confirmation statute unquestionably provides for debtor
relief by establishing a "procedure which . . . limits the creditor's

common-law right to seek a deficiency judgment," we find nothing to
support a conclusion that the General Assembly intended further to
extinguish that common-law right merely because the underlying note
24 5
was assigned to another creditor after the foreclosure sale.

The appellants in Titshaw found more success with their second
argument. While the foreclosing lender presented evidence that the fair
market value of the property was $595,000, it neglected to provide
evidence of the amount the property brought at the foreclosure sale. In
fact, the report of the sale to the superior court judge prior to filing the

240. This section was authored by Dylan W. Howard, associate in the law firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University
(B.A., 1999); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2002). Member, State
Bar of Georgia
241. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 (2002).
242. 304 Ga. App. 712, 697 S.E.2d 837 (2010).
243. Id. at 712, 697 S.E.2d at 838-39.
244. Id. at 713, 697 S.E.2d at 839 (internal quotation marks omitted); O.C.G.A. § 44-14161(a).
245. Titshaw, 304 Ga. App. at 715, 697 S.E.2d at 840-41 (quoting Vlass v. Sec. Pac.
Nat'l Bank, 263 Ga. 296, 298, 430 S.E.2d 732, 735 (1993)).
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confirmation contained a typographical error indicating that the property
sold for $550,000.246 Even though the trial judge indicated in the
confirmation order that the recitation in the report to the lower sales
price was a typographical error and that the rest of the pleadings
indicated that the sale price was the higher amount, the court of appeals
held that neither the pleadings nor the evidence produced at the
confirmation hearing showed that the property sold for at least
$595,000.247 Based on this apparent oversight, the court of appeals
reversed the confirmation order.2 48
In Mundy Mill Development, LLC v. ACR Property Services, LP,2 4 9
the appellant sought to challenge the conclusion reached by the
foreclosing lender's appraiser that the property at issue was worth
$3,680,000. The appraiser based this conclusion, in part, on the fact
that the borrower had accepted an offer to sell the property in the same
amount.250 The appellant argued that the accepted offer was a "quick
sale" offer and that "quick sale prices are 'not reflective of true market
value."' 25 ' The appellant relied on prior precedent where the Georgia
Court of Appeals specifically held that confirming a foreclosure sale
based solely on evidence of the quick sale value "does not reflect the
price that would be obtained in a sale under the usual market conditions."252 The court of appeals concluded that this precedent did not
require reversal of the confirmation order in the instant case because the
lender's appraiser based his conclusion on a number of factors including,
but not limited to, the quick sale value.253 The court noted that "[oln
appellate review, the test is not whether this court would have accepted
appellant's expert appraisals as the most reliable and accurate, but
whether the record contains any evidence to support the findings of the
trial court that the property brought its true market value at the
foreclosure sale."254 Applying this standard, the court of appeals
affirmed the confirmation order.255

246. Id. at 717-18, 697 S.E.2d at 842.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 718, 697 S.E.2d at 842.
249. 306 Ga. App. 730, 703 S.E.2d 137 (2010).
250. Id. at 732-33, 703 S.E.2d at 138-39.
251. Id. at 733, 703 S.E.2d at 149.
252. Id. (quoting Gutherie v. Ford Equip. Leasing Co., 206 Ga. App. 258, 261, 424
S.E.2d 889, 892 (2010)).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 734, 703 S.E.2d at 139-40 (quoting Blue Marlin Dev., LLC v. Branch
Banking & Trust Co., 302 Ga. App. 120, 122, 690 S.E.2d 252, 254 (2010)).
255. Id. at 734, 703 S.E.2d at 140.
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Balboa Life & Casualty, LLC v. Home Builders Finance, Inc.'
involved property that was foreclosed upon following substantial fire
The court of appeals concluded that a lender may be
damage."'
entitled to foreclose on the property for the full amount owed on the
underlying mortgage and to collect insurance proceeds arising from the
fire.258 According to the court, the general rule is that, because
"insurance proceeds are an alternative source of payment on the
mortgage debt, the mortgagee's right to insurance proceeds is extinguished to the extent the debt is paid by other sources, including
foreclosure ... ."259 Analyzing prior precedent, the court reasoned that
while full payment of the amount owed would preclude a lender from
seeking a deficiency judgment, it would not preclude a lender from
obtaining insurance proceeds, so long as the value of the property was
less than the outstanding mortgage debt.26 o In Balboa, the court
concluded that the foreclosure sale price established the fair market
value, and since the difference between the mortgage debt and the fair
market value was greater than the amount of the insurance proceeds,
the court refused to overrule the trial court's determination that the
lender was entitled to the insurance proceeds.2 6 '
The Georgia Supreme Court, in MPP Investments, Inc. v. Cherokee
Bank, N.A., 262 addressed when, under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80,263 a lender's interest in real property reverts to the grantor.264 While the
statute provides an exception where a foreclosure is conducted under
specified circumstances, the trial court affirmed the special master's
conclusion that the foreclosure relied upon by the appellant lender was
invalid as a result of the lender's failure to provide a sixty-day notice
required by the security deed.
Both the foreclosing lender and the high bidder at the foreclosure sale
appealed. First, appellants argued that the foreclosure notice issue was
waived because it was not raised at a preliminary hearing or included
in the pretrial order.2 6 6 The supreme court rejected both of these
arguments, reasoning that the foreclosure sale had occurred after the

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

304 Ga. App. 478, 697 S.E.2d 240 (2010).
Id. at 478, 697 S.E.2d at 241-42.
Id. at 479, 697 S.E.2d at 242.
Id.
Id. at 480, 697 S.E.2d at 243.
Id. at 480-81, 697 S.E.2d at 243.
288 Ga. 558, 707 S.E.2d 485 (2011).
O.C.G.A § 44-14-80 (2002).
MPP Investments, 288 Ga. at 559, 707 S.E.2d at 487.
Id. at 560, 707 S.E.2d at 487.
Id. at 560, 707 S.E.2d at 487-88.
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preliminary hearing and that the pretrial order, which should be
liberally construed, sufficiently covered the notice issue.2 6 7
Next,
appellants argued that the notice, a specific prerequisite to foreclosure
included in the security deed, was not required because the promissory
note contained no similar provision.268 The supreme court agreed with
the special master and the trial court that the notice provisions in the
note and the security deed dealt with "'different points in the life cycle
of the note and security deed' and thus do not conflict."269 Finally, the
supreme court considered and denied the third party purchaser's
contention that O.C.G.A. § 23-1-20270 entitled it to protection as a bona
fide purchaser for value.2 7 ' The court concluded that, "due to the lis
pendens and the recorded security deed held by Cherokee Bank, MPP
Investments cannot claim to be without notice that they may not have
been purchasing a good title at the foreclosure sale."272 The court also
relied on the fact that the maturity date, which triggered reversion, was
set forth in the recorded security deed and that, as a result, the third
party purchaser had constructive notice that the date of reversion had
occurred prior to the foreclosure sale.273 For both reasons, the supreme
court affirmed the conclusion reached by the special master and the trial
court that the third party purchaser was not entitled to the protection
of the bona fide purchaser statute.274
IX.

CONDEMNATION 275

In Martha K Wayt TRust v. City of Cumming,27 6 following a jury
trial, the Martha K. Wayt Trust and the Josephine W. Williams Trust
(the Trusts) appealed two evidentiary rulings. The first ruling prevented
the Trusts from presenting evidence of the cost to construct a bridge to
the remaining property. The second ruling prevented the Trusts from
presenting the value of potential stream mitigation credits. In these
rulings, the trial court excluded this evidence because it found that the

267. Id. at 560, 707 S.E.2d at 488.
268. Id. at 561-62, 707 S.E.2d at 488-89.

269. Id. at 562, 707 S.E.2d at 489.
270. O.C.G.A. § 23-1-20 (1982).
271. MPP Investments, 288 Ga. at 563, 707 S.E.2d at 490.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 564, 707 S.E.2d at 490.
274. Id.
275. This section was authored by Ivy Cadle, associate in the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Macon, Georgia. University of Georgia
(B.S., 2000; MAcc, 2002); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2007).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
276. 306 Ga. App. 790, 702 S.E.2d 915 (2010).
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witness for the Trusts lacked a sufficient foundation for his opinions.
The Trusts argued that the cost to construct a bridge was a component
of consequential damages because it represented the cost to cure the loss
of access to their property. John A. Wayt III, the representative of the
Trusts, attempted to testify to this cost to cure. As the basis for his
opinion, Mr. Wayt testified that Forsyth County officials informed him
that a bridge would be required and directed him to a company capable
of constructing such a bridge. Mr. Wayt obtained an estimate from that
company and used that single estimate as the basis for his opinion of the
cost to cure.27 7
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-667" allows a layperson to offer testimony of market
value. 279 To offer such an opinion, it must be shown that the lay
person had an opportunity to form a correct opinion. 2 80 Although a lay
opinion of market value may be based on hearsay, it cannot be a mere
recitation of another's opinion. 8 ' Here, the trial court found that Mr.
Wayt was simply reiterating a cost given by a single construction
company. 282 The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed and held that Mr.
Wayt's reliance on a single estimate was not sufficient for him to have
formed his own opinion.28 3
The Trusts also sought to introduce evidence that, on the date of
taking, they were in the process of creating a stream mitigation bank on
the property.28 4 The court of appeals noted that "[tihe sole question
presented in a condemnation proceeding is the just and adequate
compensation due the condemnee, which is determined by the market
value of the condemned property at the time of the taking . . . .85
Therefore, the fact that a property may be adapted to a different use is
not a legally sufficient justification to value property based on that
potential use.2 86 Rather, it must be shown that such a use is "so
reasonably probable as to have an effect on the present value of the
land."287 The court of appeals noted that the jury cannot consider a
possible use as an accomplished fact; it can only consider the possible
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280.
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284.
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287.

Id. at 790-91, 702 S.E.2d at 916-17.
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-66 (2010).
Id.
Wayt Trust, 306 Ga. App. at 791, 702 S.E.2d at 917.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 791-92, 702 S.E.2d at 917.
Id. at 792, 702 S.E.2d at 918.
Id. at 792-93, 702 S.E.2d at 918.
Id. at 793, 702 S.E.2d at 918.
Id.
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"use to the extent that it affects the market value on the date of
taking.",8 1 While the trial court excluded Mr. Wayt's opinion on the
grounds that he did not have sufficient opportunity to form a proper
opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the decision as "right for any
reason" because the stream mitigation bank had not yet been created,
and Wayt offered no explanation to relate the value of the credits to the
property's market value."8

In RNW Family Partnership, LTD. v. Department of ransportation 290 RNW Family Partnership, Ltd. (RNW) owned a 198.13 acre
tract in McDuffie County, Georgia, at the corner of Highway 78 and
Highway 278. The Department of Transportation (the Department)
condemned 13.022 acres of RNW's tract to construct a bypass. One of
RNW's real estate experts testified the just and adequate compensation
for the taking was $1,074,500, and the other testified it was $519,000.
The Department's expert testified the value of the taking was $109,124,
and the jury returned a verdict for $109,130.291
RNW first argued the award was so inadequate as to authorize a new
trial.2 92 However, the court of appeals held that the award was within
the range of evidence before the jury, and that this enumeration of error
lacked merit.2 93
RNW also argued that the trial court erred because it failed to give
two requested jury charges. The first requested charge concerned the
right of access to a public road and the fact that a landowner cannot be
deprived of this access right without being paid just and adequate
compensation. The second requested charge addressed the ability of a
property owner to be compensated for any substantial interference with
294
access even if the condemning authority does not eliminate access.
The court of appeals considered the requested charges in light of the
instruction given and held that the trial court's instructions were nearly
identical to the first requested charge and that the charge on access
sufficiently covered the topic. 295 Because the trial court substantially
covered the principles embodied in the requested charges, there was no

error.2 96

288. Id.
289. Id.
290. 307 Ga. App. 108, 704 S.E.2d 211 (2010).
291. Id. at 108, 704 S.E.2d at 213.
292. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-12-12(b) (2000).
293. 307 Ga. App. at 108-09, 704 S.E.2d at 213 (quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Jordan, 300
Ga. App. 104, 107, 684 S.E.2d 141, 144 (2009)).
294. 307 Ga. App. at 109, 704 S.E.2d at 213.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 109, 706 S.E.2d at 213-14.
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RNW next argued that the Department's expert relied on an impermissible "pro rata" valuation method.29 7 It is improper to value the
portion condemned on a pro rata basis relative to the entire tract "in the
2 98
At
absence of an evidentiary foundation for such a conclusion."
trial, RNW's first appraiser testified that the taking eliminated the
"commercial aspect" along certain frontage and that the road project
would lower the value of the houses and lots in a certain area of the
property.2 99 RNW's second appraiser testified that the remainder
would have no access along Augusta Highway and that the taking would
remove the commercial viability for the property adjacent to the
intersection.3 0 0 The court of appeals interpreted this testimony to
establish that RNW's experts determined the value per acre of the
portion taken to be more than the value per acre of the whole tract.0 1
The Department's appraiser testified that the property remaining after
the taking would be enhanced by the road project which would make it
Furthermore, he testified that the
"more readily marketable."3 02
property would remain as agricultural land until the demand for a more
On that basis, the expert "essentially
intensive use developed. 0
concluded that the value per acre of the portion taken from the whole is
less than the value per acre of the whole tract."3 04 Thus, the court of
appeals held that RNW failed to show how using the pro rata valuation
technique lacked evidentiary foundation.0 5
Finally, RNW contended that the trial court erred by failing to inform
the jury that a cost to cure could be considered as part of consequential
damages. After an exchange with the trial court, RNW was afforded an
opportunity to elicit relevant testimony from its witness. After that
testimony, the trial court instructed the jury that the cost to cure is not
a separate item of damage to be recovered by the condemnee."'
However, the court of appeals noted that the trial court failed to instruct
the jury that it could consider the cost to cure as a factor establishing
the reduced fair market value of the remaining property, but also noted
that RNW waived any claim of error because it made no objection after

297. Id. at 109-10, 704 S.E.2d at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted).
298. Id. at 110, 704 S.E.2d at 214 (quoting Ga. Dep't of Transp. v. Crumbley, 271 Ga.
App. 706, 708, 610 S.E.2d 663, 666 (2005)).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 110-11, 704 S.E.2d at 214-15.
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the court issued its instruction.3 0 The court of appeals held that RNW
also waived another claim of error related to the Department's opening
statements because RNW did not object to these statements at trial.os
Practice Tips: (1) If a jury award is within the range of evidence
presented, it was authorized by the evidence; (2) there is no error if a
trial court refuses to give a requested charge if the trial court gives a
similar charge on the relevant point of law; (3) if an appraisal is based
on an appropriate evidentiary foundation, consideration of pro rata
valuation technique may be appropriate; (4) if you do not object, your
enumeration of error will not be considered.

Eagle's Landing Christian Church, Inc. v. Henry County309 involved
the Eagle's Landing Christian Church's (the Church) appeal from the
trial court's order dismissing its answer to a declaration of taking filed
by Henry County. The trial court dismissed the Church's answer
because it failed to express the Church's dissatisfaction with the
compensation deposited in the court registry. Therefore, the trial court
refused to construe the answer as a timely notice of appeal.3 ,0
Reviewing this question of law for plain legal error, the court of
appeals considered O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14,a1 which provides a condemnee
with the right to express dissatisfaction with the amount of compensation as estimated in the declaration of taking.312 As the court noted,
this right must be exercised "at any time subsequent to the filing of the
declaration and the deposit of the fund into court, but not later than 30
days following the date of the service .

...

To exercise this right, a condemnee normally files a pleading entitled
"notice of appeal" that informs the trial court that the condemnee wants
to challenge the award of compensation.3 14 Here, the Church's answer,
"[elven given a generous reading," failed to discuss the condemnation
award."' Relying on precedent where the court of appeals held that
the pleading "must express dissatisfaction with the proposed compensation," the ruling of the trial court was affirmed.'
Practice Tip: Use

307. Id. at 112, 704 S.E.2d at 215.
308. Id.
309. 308 Ga. App. 416, 708 S.E.2d 23 (2011).
310. Id. at 416, 708 S.E.2d at 23.
311. O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14 (2009).
312. Eagle's Landing, 308 Ga. App. at 416-17, 708 S.E.2d at 23-24; O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14.
313. Eagle's Landing, 308 Ga. App. at 417, 708 S.E.2d at 24 (internal quotation marks
omitted); O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14.
314. Eagle's Landing, 308 Ga. App. at 417, 708 S.E.2d at 24.
315. Id. at 417-18, 708 S.E.2d at 24.
316. Id. (quoting Howard v. Dep't of Transp., 184 Ga. App. 116, 117, 361 S.E.2d 7, 8-9
(1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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"Notice of Appeal" as the title of any initial pleading responsive to a
condemnation. State therein, "The condemnee is dissatisfied with the
compensation paid or estimated by the condemning authority."

